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Abstract—As climate concerns, low natural gas prices, and re-
newable technologies increase the electric power sector’s depend-
ence on natural gas-fired power plants, operational and invest-
ment models for gas and electric power systems will need to in-
corporate the interdependencies between these two systems to 
accurately capture the impacts of one on the other. Currently, 
few hybrid gas-electricity models exist. This paper reviews the 
state of the art for hybrid gas-electricity models and presents a 
new model and case study to illustrate a few potential coupling 
effects between gas and electric power systems. Specifically, the 
proposed model analyzes the optimal operation of gas-fired 
power plants in a competitive electricity market taking into con-
sideration gas purchases, gas capacity contracting, and residual 
demand uncertainty for the generation company due to renew-
able energy sources. 
 
Index Terms—Electric power market, natural gas market, op-
timization model, renewable energy integration, risk averseness 
 
NOTATION 
The main notation used in this paper is stated below for 
quick reference. Other symbols are defined as needed 
throughout the paper. 
Indices: 
e: (e’, e*) Gas consumers: (Genco, city) 
z Gas spot market 
p Pipeline 
g Thermal power plants 
m Months 
d Days 
l States of the system 
k Wind scenarios 
 
Parameters: 
α0 Cost intercept of gas-demand price curve 
α1 Cost slope of gas-demand price curve 
GDpe*dk Gas demand of consumer e*  
GQp Pipeline capacity 
ωk Probability of each scenario 
CFp Long-term pipeline capacity price 
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CFpm Medium-term pipeline capacity price 
CFpd Short-term pipeline capacity price 
CVp Pipeline utilization price 
DEpe’dk Gas demand estimation of consumer e’ 
Smine’ Minimum average percentage of firm capacity 
βe’ Probability of reaching the minimum percentage 
PDmlk Power demand in state of the system l 
Qmxg Maximum power of power generator g 
Qmng Technical minimum of power generator g 
CVg Variable cost of power generator g 
CFg Commitment cost of power generator g 
CYg Start-up cost of power generator g 
CZg Shut-down cost of power generator g 
Tdlk Time duration of state of the system l 
Nmll’k Number of transitions between states l and l’ 
Fg Gas-to-power conversion factor of power genera-
tor g 
 
Variables: 
dpedk Gas demand of consumer e (a power generator) 
hpe Long-term capacity contract of consumer e 
hpem Medium-term capacity contract of consumer e 
hpedk Short-term capacity contract of consumer e 
thpedk Contract portfolio of consumer e 
∆hpedk Capacity acquisition of consumer e 
∇hpedk Capacity release of consumer e 
se’k (s’e’k) Average percentage of firm capacity in scenario 
k (Auxiliary variable) 
ŝe’ Minimum average percentage of firm capacity 
reached with probability βe’ 
qgmlk Power produced by power generator g 
ugmlk Commitment of power generator g 
ygmll’k Start-up of power generator g 
zgmll’k Shut-down of power generator g 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ver the last two decades, natural gas has played an in-
creasingly larger role as an input fuel for electricity pro-
duction. Gas consumption in the United States electric power 
sector increased 2.24 times from 1997 to 2012. In the Euro-
pean Union, natural gas share of the generation mix increased 
from 8% in 1990 to 23% in 2010. Furthermore, technological 
improvements in shale gas extraction and the subsequent re-
duction in costs have boosted reliance on natural gas for elec-
tricity generation.  
Beyond these facts and numbers, two main reasons explain 
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the likelihood that gas will remain the preferred fossil fuel for 
electricity generation over other fossil fuels such as coal or oil 
distillates. First, while gas prices may not necessarily remain 
lower than coal prices in terms of monetary units per unit of 
released thermal energy, gas-fired power plants (GFPPs) have 
higher conversion efficiencies than coal plants. Typical gas 
plants operate with thermal efficiencies near 60%, while typi-
cal coal plants operate with thermal efficiencies near 30%. 
Consequently, in electric power systems with environmental 
regulations that limit or tax emissions such as CO2, SO2, 
and/or NOx, gas technologies will habitually undercut other 
fossil fuel technologies. Second, because GFPPs have signifi-
cantly lower investment costs relative to other types of thermal 
plants, the rate of return on investment for GFPPs is relatively 
large compared to other fossil fuel technologies. For these 
reasons, the generation mix for power systems will likely 
continue to feature GFPPs. 
In addition to these favorable economic traits, GFPPs have 
also recently played a prominent role providing operational 
flexibility—specifically, with respect to ramp rates and start-
up/shut-down times compared to other thermal technologies—
to electric power systems with intermittent renewable energy 
sources. Yet, to provide this flexibility, the owners of gas 
generators in power systems with liberalized markets must 
incorporate the uncertainty of renewable energy sources into 
their decision-making process—particularly when they con-
tract for pipeline capacity—well in advance of actually know-
ing their electricity commitments. The increasing importance 
of GFPPs in electric power systems for both economic and 
environmental reasons justifies the joint analysis of gas and 
electricity systems.  
In particular, most electricity models today ranging from 
short-term unit commitment to long-term capacity expansion 
assume that gas generators have perfectly reliable fuel sup-
plies. However, due to competition for both gas pipeline ca-
pacity and for gas in spot markets, this assumption about per-
fectly reliable fuel supplies may not always hold. Although 
pipeline companies have made large investments to adapt their 
infrastructure in anticipation of greater gas demand, electricity 
generation companies can still face pipeline capacity scarcities 
that prevent them from participating in electricity markets. For 
example, if several consumers (e.g., households, industries, 
and generation companies) share a common pipeline, and 
capacity on that pipeline becomes scarce in the middle of 
winter due to increased gas consumption for heat, electricity 
generation companies may not have access to the pipeline 
capacity that they need to receive their fuel. System operators 
such as the Independent System Operator of New England 
(ISO-NE) and the New York Independent System Operator 
(NYISO) have recently raised these types of capacity concerns 
with respect to the operation of the GFPPs within their sys-
tems. 
In addition to physical constraints related to scarce pipeline 
capacity, economic issues may also prevent GFPPs from offer-
ing generation to electricity markets. Electricity generation 
companies must purchase their gas through long-term con-
tracts or in the spot market. In gas spot markets, prices tend to 
be directly proportional to demand, and these prices directly 
influence the behavior of gas generators in electricity markets. 
Consequently, given the difficulties with forecasting electric-
ity demand, renewable generation, and fuel price/capacity 
uncertainty, a GFPP may inadequately contract in advance for 
the fuel capacity that it needs on any given day. In particular, 
the owner of a GFPP may be risk averse to committing to 
long-term contracts for capacity and instead opt to rely mostly 
on secondary markets. As GFPPs increasingly compete with 
industrial users and utilities for pipeline capacity, the different 
daily demand profile of GFPPs versus other large consumers 
in the gas market, combined with the tendency for GFPPs to 
acquire capacity in secondary markets, may significantly alter 
the long-term investment signals of gas networks and exacer-
bate gas-electricity dependencies. 
This paper’s main contribution is a proposed model to in-
vestigate the long-term capacity contracting behavior of 
GFPPs under net electricity demand, i.e., after the renewable 
generation is dispatched. The model presented in Section III of 
this paper analyzes the decision process of a generation com-
pany that participates in both electricity and gas spot markets. 
The generation company must contract for pipeline capacity in 
competition with other gas consumers. Lastly, the electricity 
market that the generation company participates in clears 
subject to uncertainty from renewable energy sources.  
Before this model description, Section II reviews the current 
state-of-the-art of hybrid gas-electricity models. Following the 
model description, Section IV describes the input data for the 
case study. Section V contains the results of the case study, 
and Section VI concludes. 
II. CURRENT HYBRID GAS-ELECTRICITY MODELS 
Following a similar structure to classify current models ac-
cording to their temporal scope as presented in [5], for a single 
snapshot time period, various authors have proposed models 
that jointly analyze the gas and power system by including the 
gas network and compressor stations. Their main objective is 
to examine the functioning of both systems from a technical 
point of view. For example, one such objective may be to 
evaluate the maximum amount of electric power generation 
possible from all of the combined-cycle power plants in a 
power system, taking into consideration gas demand by 
nonelectric customers, the gas network, and gas availability is 
evaluated in [6]. In addition to updating the treatment of 
GFPPs by including the gas system, [6] also introduces a new 
stakeholder in the gas-electric system that did not previously 
exist in the electric power system alone: nonelectric consum-
ers whose demand for gas might preempt demand for gas in 
the electric sector. Other models recognize the welfare of all 
agents (consumers and producers) in both systems when de-
termining the optimal set of gas and power flows and corre-
sponding marginal prices [7], [8]. Interruptible gas contracts, 
which may modify the joint operation, are included in a cost-
minimizing security-constrained unit commitment model that 
also takes into consideration optimal gas flows [9]. 
In the short term, the impact on the power system of differ-
ent contingencies in the gas infrastructure that cut off the sup-
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ply of GFPPs is discussed in [10]; the unit commitment prob-
lem subject to gas network constraints with the possibility of 
fuel switching is solved in [11]; line-pack capacity and gas 
storage facilities when minimizing the gas supply, gas opera-
tion and electricity generation costs are included in [12]; and 
besides gas storage, compressor stations to solve the unit 
commitment problem are consider in [13]. 
In the medium and long term there is little literature to our 
knowledge. In the medium term, a dynamic programming 
model to obtain the operation plan of hydrothermal and gas 
systems subject to stochasticity is proposed in [14], and a 
profit-maximization model that includes gas network conges-
tions to manage gas supply contracts in imperfect power mar-
kets is proposed in [15]. In the long term, an extension of [8] 
to capacity expansion of both systems is shown in [16]. 
Previous models have only focused on one time horizon: 
single period [6]–[9]; short-term [10]–[13]; and medium- and 
long-term [14]–[16]. Hence, to the authors’ knowledge, cur-
rently no gas-electricity model analyzes how long- and me-
dium-term decisions may influence short-term decisions (or 
vice versa). Yet, coordination among different temporal deci-
sions becomes critical when operating in two intertwined 
energy systems, such as the gas and electric power systems.  
Consider, for example, short-term power generation deci-
sions that are constrained by long-term pipeline capacity con-
tracting decisions. Frequently, capacity contract decisions 
must be made years in advance, and optimizing these deci-
sions requires taking into consideration future short-term sce-
narios. Therefore, in this paper, we propose an optimization 
model that spans multiple time horizons to analyze how a firm 
that owns a fleet of gas generation plants should make long- 
and medium- term contracting decisions in a perfectly com-
petitive electric power market subject to short-term renewable 
sources uncertainty. 
III. GAS-ELECTRICITY DECISION MODEL 
Our main objective is to simulate a generation company that 
owns a set of GFPPs, purchases gas in a spot market, and 
contracts pipeline capacity. We have tried to fill a gap of in-
terest in current deregulated gas and power systems by model-
ing how long- and medium-term decisions related to pipeline 
capacity contracting influence short-term decisions related to 
GFPP operation, which is simultaneously subject to renewable 
power generation uncertainty. 
 
  
Fig. 1.  Overall model structure 
 
In this model, the gas spot market is connected with the 
electricity market through a gas pipeline (Fig.1). The pur-
chased gas flows through the pipeline, as long as capacity has 
been contracted, to either the electricity market or to other gas 
consumers such as industrial users or households. However, 
gas consumption in the electricity market also depends on a 
market-clearing process in which gas must compete with other 
fossil fuels (coal, oil, etc.). Let us assume that intermittent 
wind and solar are always dispatched. 
Additionally, there is a zonal gas spot market, z. A gas pipe-
line, p, (there may be other pipelines, but we focus on one 
specific pipeline,) connects the market with two main con-
sumers, e’ (a power generation company; hereinafter, Genco) 
and e* (a city), although an extension to more consumers, 
e=1,2,…,E, is straightforward. A balance between inflows 
(market purchases) and outflows (demands) is monitored each 
day, d=1,2,…,D. Gas covers industrial users and households 
demand and feeds GFPPs. These GFPPs and the other thermal 
power plants in this system constitute the group of power 
generators, g=1,2,…,G, that satisfy the residual thermal elec-
tricity demand after dispatching renewable generation. As 
long as renewable power generation and temperature are sub-
ject to uncertainty, residual electricity and gas city demands 
are defined for different scenarios, k=1,2,…,K. 
The model is formulated as a mixed-integer programming 
(MIP) problem. We start with the description of the gas spot 
market model. Then we present the capacity contracting 
model, which accounts for risk averseness. Finally, we intro-
duce the electricity market model and its link to the gas sys-
tem. In this model description, uppercase letters represent 
parameters, while lowercase letters represent continuous and 
positive variables (except where explicitly indicated other-
wise). 
A. Minimizing gas acquisition costs  
Let us consider that the functional form of the marginal cost 
curve of gas C(GDzdk) for daily purchases GDzdk in the balanc-
ing zone can be represented by an affine function with cost 
intercept α0, and cost slope α1: 
 
 (1) 
 
As previously noted, there is a gas pipeline, p, connected to 
this balancing zone, which supplies gas to two consumers: a 
city, e*, and a Genco, e’. For the sake of simplicity, let us 
suppose that the city demand, GDpe*dk, which is subject to 
uncertainty, determines the gas price in each scenario; i.e., 
GDzdk= GDpe*dk. The Genco behaves as a price-taker and 
minimizes its expected gas acquisition costs in order to supply 
the demand of its GFPPs, dpe’dk, which is simultaneously ob-
tained when the electric power market is cleared as described 
in section III.C and by applying the power-to-gas conversion 
(19) defined in Section III.D: 
 
 (2) 
 
where parameter ωk represents the scenario occurrence prob-
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ability. Although the gas spot market is liquid and large, and 
purchases are not limited, total gas demand for the Genco is 
constrained by pipeline capacity, GQp. In addition, the Genco 
must share the total pipeline capacity with the city: 
 
 (3) 
 
Objective function (2) subject to constraint (3) constitutes a 
LP problem that minimizes the Genco’s expected gas acquisi-
tion costs. 
B. Minimizing capacity contract portfolio costs 
Generally, the pipeline operator offers capacity contracts 
with different time scopes. Accordingly, consumers can con-
tract capacity in the long term hpe (i.e., during several years), 
in the medium term hpem (i.e., during a month), and in the short 
term hpedk (i.e., during a day). The correspondence between 
time scopes and time horizons follows a standard that com-
monly takes place in reality. Standardized long-term contracts 
expire several years later. Medium-term contracts expire the 
next month, and short-term capacity contracts expire the next 
day. In addition, we consider that long- and medium- term 
contracts represent firm capacity commitments, while short-
term contracts represent non-firm capacity commitments be-
cause gas consumers are unaware that enough free capacity 
will be made available to them when the contracting time 
comes. The immediate consequence is that short-term con-
tracting decisions are different for each scenario k and are thus 
subject to renewable energy and gas city demand uncertainty, 
while long- and medium-term contracting decisions are com-
mon for every scenario. 
Capacity prices vary with time scope. Additionally, we as-
sume that it is less expensive to contract for capacity in the 
long term CFp than in the medium term CFpm, and that it is 
less expensive to contract for capacity in the medium term 
than in the short term CFpd. This assumption reflects with the 
pipeline operator’s anticipation of income and reduction of 
risk due to idle pipeline capacity and is in line with the deci-
sions that an operator would make to support the recovery of 
its costs of service. Furthermore, the pipeline operator may 
apply a variable tariff CVp to gas flows as a value-of-service 
rate which covers direct costs, such as fuel consumption or gas 
leakages. 
In general, any gas consumer will minimize the resulting 
costs from contracting firm and non-firm capacity and utiliz-
ing pipeline capacity: 
 
 (4) 
 
Daily, each gas consumer holds a portfolio thpedk of long-, 
medium-, and short-term capacity contracts: 
 
 (5) 
 
Similar to gas demand, which is limited by pipeline capac-
ity (3), total consumers’ capacity portfolios are also restricted 
by the maximum pipeline capacity: 
  
 (6) 
 
If a consumer has contracted enough capacity including ac-
quisitions ∆hpedk and releases ∇hpedk, the operator will let gas 
flow through the pipeline: 
 
 (7) 
 
in which the demand of the GFPPs, dpe’dk is simultaneously 
obtained when the electric power market is cleared as de-
scribed in section III.C and by applying the power-to-gas 
conversion (19) defined in Section III.D  
These agents acquire needed capacity and release excess 
capacity in the secondary capacity market. The dual variable 
of the capacity balance constraint, πpdk, provides the secondary 
capacity market price. Again, this price does not necessarily 
coincide with the short-term capacity price: 
 
 (8) 
 
Acquisitions in secondary capacity markets depend on the 
willingness of a capacity holder to release its unused capacity. 
In addition to the unknown acquisition price that results from 
the secondary market clearing, “willingness” is the main dif-
ference between acquisitions in secondary markets and short-
term contracts in primary markets. Nevertheless, unwilling-
ness to release unused capacity due to anticompetitive behav-
iors, such as capacity hoarding, does not occur within the 
perfectly competitive framework that we are assuming. There-
fore, in this model, capacity acquired via secondary markets 
and short-term contracts will differ only in price. Although the 
released capacity may include the equivalent gas commodity, 
we maintain both products separately; consequently, capacity 
acquisitions are not directly influenced by gas purchases. 
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to think that any gas con-
sumer will not contract short-term capacity to subsequently 
release it in secondary markets. For this reason, releases are 
limited to the portion of contract portfolios that consists of 
long- and medium-term capacity contracts: 
 
 (9) 
 
However, the act of acquiring released capacity from an-
other gas consumer involves greater uncertainty than contract-
ing for short-term capacity from the pipeline operator. Acquir-
ing released capacity depends on the capacity requirements of 
other market agents. The risk is modeled in the same way as 
Value at Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) 
measures are incorporated into optimization problems [17, 
18], but adapted to our purpose, which is to consider the inse-
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curity of participating in secondary capacity markets. 
Let us define the average percentage of daily non-firm con-
tracted capacity, se’dk, in each scenario as one plus a tolerance, 
ε, minus the relationship between the daily contract portfolio 
and an estimation of the demand, DEpe’dk: 
 
 (10) 
 
As se’dk is a positive variable, contracting capacity over the 
estimated demand is ineffective when ε=0. Nevertheless, ε>0 
allows the consideration of contracting (1+ε)·100% capacity 
over the estimated demand. 
Let us now define the average percentage of firm capacity, 
se’k, as: 
 
 (11) 
 
A minimum average percentage of firm capacity, Smine’, 
can be established with the following constraints: 
 
 (12) 
 (13) 
 
where ŝe’ is the minimum average percentage of firm capacity 
that will be reached with a probability of βe’; and s’e’k is an 
auxiliary and positive variable which is zero when se’k is 
higher than ŝe’. 
Objective function (4) subject to constraints (5)–(13) consti-
tutes an LP problem in which gas consumers minimize pipe-
line contracting and operation costs considering risk associ-
ated to participating in secondary capacity markets. 
C. Minimizing power plants operation costs 
One of the main consequences of electric power system gas-
ification is the dependence of electricity prices on gas costs. 
Moreover, in high demand scenarios, if generation companies 
have not accurately predicted pipeline capacity requirements 
or gas purchases, the power system may face non-supplied 
energy situations. Examining how generation companies oper-
ate in gas systems is, therefore, economically and technically 
justified. 
Before describing the electricity market model, let us focus 
on electricity demand. Demand and supply must be balanced 
instantaneously because electricity in most power systems 
cannot be stored at competitive costs. Modeling power sys-
tems with such a level of temporal detail would be intractable. 
For instance, system and/or market operators that utilize algo-
rithms to determine the optimal dispatch “group these in-
stants” into hours [19]. But even modeling each hour in the 
long or medium term may be troublesome. For this reason, 
traditionally, a load duration curve has been constructed and 
some load levels (e.g., peak and off-peak, working and non-
working days) that were able to capture the behavior of hydro-
thermal systems with no penetration of renewable energy 
sources have been established. Recently, to accommodate 
renewable energy deployment, a net load duration curve (de-
mand minus renewable power generation) is sometimes used 
to define load levels. The main disadvantage of using this 
procedure to define load levels is that off-peak load levels will 
combine hours of high demand and high wind conditions with 
(significantly different) hours of low demand and low wind 
conditions. Moreover, maintaining hourly chronology leads to 
a more realistic representation of demand because renewable 
energy intermittency can heavily influence the operation of 
power plants. For these reasons, we define load levels using 
“system states.” A system state is a predefined set of circum-
stances that occur simultaneously and frequently in a power 
system during an analyzed period of time (a week, a month, a 
year, etc.); hence, each hour is assigned to a state with the 
advantage of maintaining the chronology because transitions 
between states, i.e., transitions between hours, are known. 
Further details on the system states definition are provided in 
[20]. 
Returning to the model description, we can define several 
system states l=1,2,…,L. Consequently, each day is made up 
of different states, and the duration of each state in hours Tdlk 
is known. As previously mentioned, load levels are defined for 
a period of time (hereinafter, a month). The chronology is 
maintained because the number of transitions between two 
states, l and l’, within a month m is known Nmll’k. 
We have defined the net electricity demand PDmlk in each 
load level within a month as the difference between the elec-
tricity power demand and the renewable power generation. 
Therefore, there is a net demand curve as well as different 
system state durations and transition matrices for each renew-
able power generation scenario. Generation companies that 
own thermal power plants produce electric power qgmlk: 
 
 (14) 
 
One advantage of using QP and LP problems is the possibil-
ity of obtaining dual variables of technical constraints whose 
economic interpretation is usually of interest. For instance, the 
dual variables of (14), divided by the duration, are the mar-
ginal system prices for electricity given each residual demand 
scenario, month, and load level. 
The generated quantity is limited by a maximum power 
level Qmxg a technical minimum level Qmng, and a binary 
decision variable ugmlk that reveals whether the group is com-
mitted: 
 
 (15) 
 (16) 
 
Nonetheless, group commitments actually depend on start-
up and shut-down decisions. If a group starts up between 
states l and l’ (obviously, it was not committed in state l), it 
will be committed during state l’. In contrast, a group will not 
be committed if it was committed in state l and shuts down 
between states l and l’. Last, if a group does not start up or 
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shut down between states l and l’, it remains in its current 
commitment mode during both l and l’. Constraint (17), which 
includes start-up ygmll’k and shut-down decisions zgmll’k, de-
scribes these processes: 
 
 (17) 
 
Note that start-up and shut-down decision variables need 
not be binary, but only bounded between zero and one, be-
cause their value is automatically determined by the binary 
commitment decisions. 
The behavior of generation companies in perfectly competi-
tive markets is equivalent to minimizing the operating costs of 
all the thermal power plants in a system plus the cost to con-
sumers of unmet demand (Appendix). The main costs of ther-
mal groups can be summarized in variable costs CVg (related 
to generation); fixed costs CFg (related to commitment); start-
up costs CYg and shut-down cost CZg: 
 
 (18) 
 
Observe that power plant operation is a short-term decision. 
In addition, start-up and shut-down decisions are multiplied by 
the number of transitions between states to internalize prop-
erly these costs. (GFPP variable costs connected to a zonal 
spot market are already considered in (2) and, hence, CVg=0). 
Objective function (18) subject to constraints (14)–(17) 
constitutes a MIP problem, in which thermal power plants are 
dispatched. 
D. Coupling gas and electricity markets 
So far, we have broken down a model that optimizes gas 
purchases and, in particular, long-term pipeline capacity con-
tracting under uncertainty of renewable energy sources within 
a perfectly competitive framework. From the point of view of 
company e’, the gas demand is given by the cost-minimizing 
operation problem in which it (and every Genco) behaves as a 
price-taker. Conditioned to this demand, the company e’ 
minimizes the costs associated with its participation in gas 
spot and capacity markets in which gas and pipeline capacity 
are purchased, respectively. Moreover, it also internalizes the 
risks of participating in secondary capacity markets. These 
decisions are actually obtained at the same time as the above 
optimization problems are merged into a single optimization 
problem. However, a constraint that links GFPP production to 
gas operation has not been established yet. In detail, each day, 
GFPPs connected to the analyzed pipeline consume a quantity 
of gas that depends on their gas-to-power conversion factor 
Fg: 
 
 (19) 
 
After incorporating constraint (19), we obtain a MIP model 
that achieves our main objective of analyzing the long- and 
medium-term contracting decisions of company e‘ while tak-
ing into consideration short-term operations and risks: 
 
  
IV. CASE STUDY: DATA DESCRIPTION 
Our objective is to analyze a Genco that only owns GFPPs. 
Therefore, the Genco must coordinate its purchases in the gas 
spot market with its pipeline capacity contract portfolio. Si-
multaneously, this Genco must compete in the electricity mar-
ket with other power producers. We do not intend to represent 
an actual system, but a system that reproduces actual operating 
conditions. Our system consists of a gas spot market, a shared 
gas pipeline and an electricity market. Capacities, prices, etc. 
are inspired by real systems, but do not represent a specific 
system. The time scope is one year. 
The gas spot market is characterized by a price-quantity 
curve. The minimum daily price is 12 €/MWh-t. (‘-t’ indicates 
units of thermal energy. Later, ‘-e’ is used for units of electric 
energy.) The slope of the price-quantity curve amounts to 0.05 
(€/MWh-t)/GWh-t. In addition, the gas spot market establishes 
gas system prices for GFPPs that are not connected to the 
shared pipeline. For the sake of clarity, we consider neither the 
contracting nor the operation of other pipelines whose refer-
ence price is determined by the gas spot market. 
Gas pipeline capacity amounts to 85 GWh-t/day. The pipe-
line supplies a city. Of importance, during times of conges-
tion, the city’s gas demand takes priority over other demand. 
Moreover, the city’s demand determines gas prices. The city 
demand is subject to uncertainty as shown in Fig. 2. We define 
five scenarios: central, ±5% and ±10%. These scenarios reflect 
two relevant cold snaps that can reduce free pipeline capacity 
by up to 10% for other gas consumers. In this example, the 
stylized Genco owns the following four GFPPs that are con-
nected to the same pipeline as the city: CCGT1, CCGT2, 
OCGT1 and OCGT2 (shown in Table II and Table III). One of 
the basic concerns about gas-power systems that we have tried 
to represent with this system is how scarce capacity affects the 
contracting and operation of a Genco. In the worst scenario, 
free pipeline capacity after supplying the city allows the 
Genco to use its four GFPPs at full capacity during 184 days, 
or its two CCGTs during 325 days and its two OCGTs during 
349 days (each at full capacity). 
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Fig. 2.  Daily city demand per scenario and unique contract portfolio 
 
The long-term capacity contract price is 26,415 €/(GWh-
t/day). The Genco pays monthly for the corresponding pipe-
line capacity during the years that the long-term contract is 
active, instead of paying for the capacity all at once, in accor-
dance with some regulatory frameworks. Medium- and short-
term contract prices are obtained after multiplying long-term 
prices by a monthly factor (Table I). As cold months are 
strongly penalized, the Genco has an incentive to contract 
properly during high demand months. For instance, the short-
term capacity costs incurred over 10 days are enough to secure 
capacity for a cold month via a medium-term contract (the 
same is true for short-term capacity costs incurred over 20 
days for a warm month). Lastly, a tariff is applied to gas flow-
ing through the pipeline equal to 567 €/GWh-t. 
 
TABLE I 
MEDIUM- AND SHORT-TERM FACTORS 
Month Medium-term factor (Monthly) 
Short-term factor 
(Daily) 
Jan-Mar 2 0.20 
Apr-Sep 1 0.05 
Oct-Dec 2 0.20 
 
In contrast, the city holds a portfolio of long- and medium-
term contracts at the beginning of the year. This portfolio 
provides the city with enough gas to cover its uncertain, but 
foreseen, demand. The portfolio, which has been optimized 
separately with the model from section III.B, is shown as the 
background shape in Fig.2. 
The power system consists of gas (CCGT and OCGT), coal 
and oil power plants whose technical characteristics and op-
eration costs are shown in Table II and Table III, respectively. 
We have utilized a real, although scaled, hourly demand 
curve (from Portugal during 2012) and five real hourly wind 
profiles (obtained between 2008-2012) to obtain five net elec-
tricity demand curves with their corresponding transition ma-
trices and state durations. System states have been computed 
with MATLAB® clustering function k-means. Mean electric 
power demand is 2.7 GW-e, while mean wind power scenarios 
range from 0.2 to 0.8 GW-e (in detail, 9%, 18%, 20%, 23%, 
and 29% wind penetration). Each scenario occurs with an 
equal probability of 0.20. 
 
TABLE II 
THERMAL GROUPS TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Thermal 
group 
Maximum power 
(MW-e) 
Minimum power 
(MW-e) 
Gas-to-power 
factor 
(MW-t/MW-e) 
CCGT1 400 200 1.7 
CCGT2 400 200 1.7 
CCGT3 400 200 1.7 
CCGT4 400 200 1.7 
Coal1 600 300 - 
Coal2 600 300 - 
OCGT1 200 - 2.5 
OCGT2 200 - 2.5 
OCGT3 200 - 2.5 
OCGT4 200 - 2.5 
Oil 600 100 - 
 
 
TABLE III 
THERMAL GROUPS COSTS 
Thermal 
group 
Variable cost 
(€/MWh-e) 
Fixed cost 
(€/h) 
Start-up 
cost (€) 
Shut-down 
cost (€) 
CCGT1 Gas market 650 50,000 3,000 
CCGT2 Gas market 650 50,000 3,000 
CCGT3 Gas market 650 50,000 3,000 
CCGT4 Gas market 650 50,000 3,000 
Coal1 35 900 100,000 7,000 
Coal2 35 900 100,000 7,000 
OCGT1 Gas market 1,000 10,000 1,000 
OCGT2 Gas market 1,000 10,000 1,000 
OCGT3 Gas market 1,000 10,000 1,000 
OCGT4 Gas market 1,000 10,000 1,000 
Oil 70 1,200 30,000 2,000 
V. CASE STUDY: RESULTS 
The MIP model has been formulated in GAMS and solved 
using CPLEX 12 on an Intel® Core™ i7 at 3.40GHz with 
16GB RAM. The computational time to solve the case study 
(310,000 variables, 25,200 integer variables, and 237,120 
equations) was 2 hours with epgap=1%, 30 minutes with ep-
gap=3% and 14 seconds when the problem is relaxed, using 6 
threads. 
Regarding the Genco behavior, let us compare three differ-
ent behaviors: 1) risk neutrality with β=0 and Smine’=0; 2) risk 
averseness with β=0.8 and Smine’=0.8; and 3) risk averseness 
with β=0.6 and Smine’=0.9. In short, the Genco may contract 
less than 80% (or 90%) firm capacity in at most 20% (or 40%) 
of all scenarios (ε=0). 
Gas flow demands and contract portfolios for the different 
behaviors are shown in Fig. 3, Fig. 4, and Fig. 5. At first sight, 
we can observe the relevance of the parameter Smine’. Firm 
capacity contracts due to acquisitions in primary markets rep-
resent 39%, 81% and 93% of total utilized capacity. In con-
trast, total profits decrease from 51.7 to 48.5 and to 46.9 mil-
lion euro because capacity in secondary markets, in which gas 
consumers trade with pipeline capacity, is much cheaper than 
short-term capacity (Fig. 6). As a matter of fact, the city gen-
erally releases its unused capacity for free except when capac-
ity is extremely scarce, that is, when constraint (6) is also 
binding. Even for days when constraint (6) binds, secondary 
market capacity prices are low (the maximum price is equal to 
252.53 €/(GWh-t/day)) because the city has no interest in 
exercising its dominant position. Given that other market 
participants may not behave competitively, the trade-off be-
tween firm capacity and profits can compromise power system 
stability in reality, as mentioned in Section I. 
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Fig. 3.  Gas demand and contract portfolio of a risk-neutral Genco 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Gas demand and contract portfolio of a risk-averse Genco, β=0.8 and 
Smine’=0.8 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Gas demand and contract portfolio of a risk-averse Genco, β=0.6 and 
Smine’=0.9 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Secondary capacity price vs. short-term capacity price 
 
The following results correspond to the first case, in which 
the Genco is risk neutral. Nevertheless, the results are in prac-
tice equal. Focusing on the whole system, we can observe a 
relationship between gas prices and expected electricity prices 
(Fig. 7). As a matter of fact, electricity price level increases 
during both cold snaps, although thermal production is almost 
constant along the year (background shape in Fig. 7). Moreo-
ver, electricity price volatility is greatly noticeable due to the 
internalization of start-up and shut-down costs. Its coefficient 
of variation, 0.31, is much higher than the gas price volatility’s 
0.05 coefficient of variation. 
Gas accounts for 54% of thermal generation, while coal ac-
counts for 45%. In contrast, a meager 1% of thermal power 
generation corresponds to oil power plants, although they are 
essential to prevent non-supplied energy. The case study could 
be a mirror of an actual system that is transiting from a coal-
based production to a gas-based production with renewable 
energy sources. Notice that hydro power plants, which often 
play a relevant role in power systems, have not been consid-
ered in this paper. 
 
   
Fig. 7.  Relationship between electricity and gas prices and free gas pipeline 
capacity 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We have addressed an intertwined energy system consisting 
of gas and electricity markets. The link between both markets 
is the GFPP that, in the framework of liberalized markets, is 
operated by a Genco which is in charge of acquiring gas, con-
tracting for pipeline capacity and submitting production offers 
to an electricity market under uncertainty. With the objective 
of supporting and analyzing the decision-taking process of 
such Genco, we have developed a novel model that optimizes 
simultaneously gas purchases in a zonal spot market, pipeline 
capacity contract portfolios and thermal power plant operation 
under renewable energy uncertainty. The main contribution is 
to highlight how a Genco would make optimal long- and me-
dium-term decisions subject to short-term uncertainty (and, 
explicitly, not to provide a model to guide short-term deci-
sions). Furthermore, we have introduced risk aversion into the 
model which allows a Genco to evaluate the trade-off between 
contracting for firm capacity or potentially obtaining larger 
profits. 
Nonetheless, additional work is still required for a thorough 
analysis of the integration between gas and electric power 
systems. Immediate future research guidelines mainly involve 
analyzing the capacity contracting effects when perfect com-
petition in both markets does not exist (e.g., market concentra-
tion in the electric power market or capacity hoarding in pipe-
lines) because anticompetitive behaviors may increase per-
verse effects for the power system. Furthermore, other con-
sumers with different interests should be included in the model 
in order to fully capture the Genco’s behavior. 
APPENDIX 
For the sake of clarity, let us suppose there are several ther-
mal power plants, g=1,2,…,G. Each thermal power plant gen-
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erates electric power qg in order to satisfy an elastic demand 
with demand intercept PD and elasticity δ with the objective 
of maximizing its profits subject to its maximum power level 
Qmxg, and its technical minimum level Qmng: 
 
  
 
where λ is the market-clearing price. The KKT conditions of 
the above problem within a perfectly competitive environment 
in which all generators are price-takers, that is, dλ/dqg=0, are 
the following: 
  
  
 
which exactly coincide, after easy operations, with the KKT 
conditions of the following cost-minimizing problem: 
 
 
For inelastic demand, d=PD, and, therefore, the second term 
of the objective function is constant. 
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